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ABSTRACT.

This article analyzes the legal arguments that students might make to
compel states that subsidize private education through voucher, tax credit scholarship, and ESA
programs to offer these programs on an equal basis, regardless of the sexual orientation or
gender identity of the student or members of the student’s family. The first section provides an
overview of voucher programs and discusses the prevalence of participating schools with antiLGBT admissions policies. The second section evaluates constitutional challenges that students
could make to invalidate the anti-LGBT admissions policies of participating voucher schools
under the state action doctrine. Specifically, we explain the possibilities and limitations of
various approaches that may be used to challenge the anti-LGBT enrollment policies of
participating private schools under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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COVENANTS TO DISCRIMINATE

I. INTRODUCTION

The headlines are troubling:
• “Choice for most: In nation’s largest voucher program, $16 million
went to schools with anti-LGBT policies”1
• “Anti-LGBT Florida schools getting school vouchers”2
• “Backed by State Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring
Gays”3
All tell the same story. Some private schools participating in state programs
that provide them with public funding apply admissions policies that prohibit the
enrollment of LGBT students or students whose parents are engaged in same-sex
relationships.4 On at least one occasion, a participating private school has refused
to admit a student on account of an anti-LGBT admission policy. 5 The stateoperated programs in question involve types of private school choice programs that
provide funding to families that they can use to attend private schools. 6 These
programs include educational vouchers, tuition tax credit scholarships, and
educational savings accounts (ESAs).7
To date, however, it appears that no student has challenged the legality of an
anti-LGBT admission policy,8 which begs the question: Why not? The answer may
1

Julia Donheiser, Choice for Most: In Nation’s Largest Voucher Program, $16 Million Went to Schools
with Anti-LGBT Policies, Chalkbeat (Aug. 10, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.chalkbeat.org/2017/8/10/
21107318/choice-for-most-in-nation-s-largest-voucher-program-16-million-went-to-schoolswith-anti-lgbt-polici [https://perma.cc/GD8F-T88E].

2

Leslie Postal & Annie Martin, Anti-LGBT Florida Schools Getting School Vouchers, Orlando
Sentinel (Jan. 23, 2020, 11:24 AM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/education/os-nevoucher-schools-lgbtq-discriminate-20200123-s5ue4nvqybcgrbrxov5hcb46a4-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/G3KX-Y6AM].
3

Kim Severson, Backed by State Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring Gays, N.Y.
Times (Jan. 20, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/education/georgia-backed-scholar
ships-benefit-schools-barring-gays.html [https://perma.cc/XN2C-Y256].
4

Postal & Martin, supra note 2.

5

Id. This article provides an example in Section I.

6

Types of Private School Choice Programs, Am. Fed’n for Child., https://www.federationfor
children.org/school-choice-america/programs-qualifications/
[https://perma.cc/P46L-67KY].
Although there are several types of private-school-choice programs, this article will use the term
“voucher” to encompass all of them.



Id.

8

See, e.g., Kate Santich & Annie Martin, Florida Voucher Critics: Spend Money on Public Schools
Instead, Orlando Sentinel (Feb. 21, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/
education/os-ne-black-pastors-school-vouchers-lgbtq-20200221-el5he7pdjvfujmfbwau6kcfj5y-

165

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

19:2 (2021)

lie in the ways in which these programs blend state actions with private decisions.
State actors clearly may not discriminate against LGBT individuals,9 but the same is
not true of private individuals. This distinction complicates a potential litigant’s
ability to challenge incidents such as those memorialized in the headlines. Yet, it is
likely that at some point students and their families will go to court to challenge
their exclusion from one of these schools and the state program that funds it.10 They
will undoubtedly claim that the private schools’ admissions policies, when part of a
public program, violate the Constitution.11 As such, they will have to prove that the
private schools’ conduct occurs as a result of state action.12 The state action doctrine
provides that the Constitution only applies to the government and those who act on
behalf of a governmental entity. 13 However, there are exceptions to this rule in
which private conduct must comply with the Constitution.14
This article analyzes the legal arguments that students might make to compel
states that subsidize private education through voucher, tax credit scholarship, and
ESA programs to offer these programs on an equal basis, regardless of the sexual
orientation or gender identity of the student or members of the student’s family.
The first section provides an overview of voucher programs. Among other things,
we identify the differences among vouchers, tuition tax credit scholarships, and
ESAs. We also discuss the prevalence of participating schools with anti-LGBT
admissions policies. The second section evaluates constitutional challenges that
students could make to invalidate the anti-LGBT admissions policies of
participating voucher schools under the state action doctrine. Specifically, we
explain the possibilities and limitations of various approaches that may be used to
story.html [https://perma.cc/8GQP-S4PD] (“there are no complaints on record from LGBTQ
students about discrimination under the voucher program.”).
9

See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034,
1050–54 (7th Cir. 2017).
10

See, e.g., Florida House of Representatives Session Video, The Florida Channel (Mar. 6,
2020), at 3:33:31 https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/3-6-20-house-session-part-1/ [https://perma
.cc/Q6YB-VD3X] (discussing the educational programming of Trinity Academy in Orlando,
Florida).
11

Adam Mengler, Note, Public Dollars, Private Discrimination: Protecting LGBT Students from School
Voucher Discrimination, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1251, 1263, 1267 (2018).
12

Id. at 1273–74; Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 665
(5th ed. 2015).
13

Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 664; Martha Minow, Alternatives to the State Action Doctrine
in the Era of Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and the Internet: Directing Law to Serve
Human Needs, 52 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 145.

14

Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 665.
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challenge the anti-LGBT enrollment policies of participating private schools under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. OVERVIEW OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS

School voucher programs have a lengthy history of discrimination.15 Indeed,
the first instances of publicly funded school choice were specifically designed to
discriminate by closing public schools and providing tax-supported vouchers to
private schools that enrolled only white students.16 These private schools, which
were often called ‘“choice’ academies” or “segregation academies,” were created in
several southern states to circumvent desegregation orders after the Brown v. Board
of Education17 decision.18 However, in 1964, the Supreme Court rejected this strategy
for avoiding segregation orders in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County.19
Interestingly, Milton Friedman, who is generally considered the architect of
voucher programs, predicted that vouchers would result in schools categorized by
race and other status characteristics.20 As he wrote in his 1962 treatise, Capitalism
and Freedom:
If a [voucher] proposal like that of the preceding chapter were adopted, it would
permit a variety of schools to develop, some all white, some all Negro, some mixed. . . .It
would in this special area, as the market does in general, permit co-operation without
conformity.21

In a note to this passage, Friedman explained that “[t]o avoid

15

Julie F. Mead, How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice, in Exploring the School
Choice Universe: Evidence and Recommendations 39, 41–42 (Gary Miron et al eds., 2012);
Mark A. Gooden et al., Race and School Vouchers: Legal, Historical, and Political Contexts, 91 Peabody
J. of Educ. 522, 524 (2016); Julie F. Mead & Suzanne E. Eckes, How School Privatization Opens the
Door for Discrimination (Nat’l Educ. Pol’y Ctr. Pol’y Brief) Dec. 6, 2018, at 6–7 (see this source for our
earlier discussion on the discriminatory practices in school voucher programs); Kevin G. Welner
& Preston C. Green, Private School Vouchers: Legal Challenges and Civils Rights Protections 1–2
(Mar. 5, 2018) (working paper for the UCLA Civil Rights Project, on file with author); Eckes, Mead,
& Ulm, infra note 29.

16

Gooden et al., supra note 15, at 524; Welner & Green, supra note 15, at 1.

17

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

18

Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil
Society 29 (Brookings Inst. Press, 1999).

19

377 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1964).

20

Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 117 (3rd ed. 2002).

21

Id. at 117–18.
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misunderstanding, . . . I am taking it for granted that the minimum requirements
imposed on schools in order that vouchers be usable do not include whether the
school is segregated or not.”22 As voucher programs began to be seriously discussed
as educational policy initiatives in the 1990s, major voucher theorists Chubb and
Moe posited that voucher systems should accept whatever sorting of students
resulted from parental choices, as long as no overt racial discrimination occurred.23
Considering the history of vouchers, it was unsurprising that researchers
warned that a full embrace of publicly funding parental choices in private schools
would result in the demise of the common school.24 The first contemporary voucher
programs were developed in the early 1990s. These programs gave eligible families
public funds to attend private schools, and they were upheld on the grounds that
they served the legitimate purpose of addressing persistent concerns about poor
public school performance. 25 The amount of the voucher, like the program
eligibility requirements, is set by state statute.26
After the Supreme Court concluded in 2002 that the Establishment Clause
permitted states to include religious schools in their voucher programs, those
programs began to spread.27 A voucher is a government-funded coupon given to a
parent or guardian that is redeemable for tuition fees at a non-public school. There
are sixteen states and the District of Columbia that have at least one voucher
program.28
In addition to voucher programs, some other choice options include education
savings accounts (ESAs) and tax credit scholarships. Tax credit scholarships and
ESAs are voucher-like programs because all three provide public subsidies to private

22

Id. at 118 n.2.

23

John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, & America’s Schools 221–22 (1990).

24

Ann Bastian, School Choice: Unwrapping the Package, in Choice in Education: Potential and
Problems 177–186 (William L. Boyd & Herbert J. Walberg eds., 1990); Albert Shanker & Bella
Rosenberg, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools: A Rejoinder, in Independent Schools,
Independent Thinkers 335–57 (Pearl Rock Kane ed., 1992); Julie Underwood, Choice is Not a
Panacea, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 599, 607–08 (1992).

25

Davis ex rel. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 546 (Wis. 1992).

26

See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 119.23(4)(bg) (2013).

27

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).

28

School Choice in America Dashboard, EdChoice, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/
school-choice-in-america/#map-overlay [https://perma.cc/9FH5-4M5C]. See also Welner & Green,
supra note 15.
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education.29 An ESA is a tax-deferred trust account created by the government that
assists families in funding educational expenses for children who are eighteenyears-old or younger.30 The parent is also permitted, depending on the state, to use
the funds for a wide variety of purposes, including homeschooling expenses or
private tutoring. 31 Typically, the parent receives a statutorily defined amount of
funds, often an amount linked to the amount of state aid a child would have received
if enrolled in a public school. 32 There are five states that offer ESAs.33 Tax credit
scholarships allow taxpayers to receive full or partial tax credits when they donate to
nonprofits that provide private school scholarships.34 Nineteen states offer one or
more forms of tax credit scholarship programs.35 While any of the three forms of
subsidy may be the subject of a challenge, most of the discussion in this article
focuses on voucher programs.
All three types of programs share some commonalities. All set eligibility
requirements for children and families to participate. Some programs may set
income limits, 36 while others may be targeted for children with disabilities. 37 All
programs also set requirements for private school participation and require the
schools to register with the state as program participants. 38 For example,
requirements may mandate that schools disclose information to prospective
students and their families or may require schools to submit to program audits.39
Programs may also set minimum standards for teacher and administrator
education. 40 While it is common for states to require that schools avoid racial
29

See Suzanne E. Eckes, Julie F. Mead, & Jessica Ulm, Dollars to Discriminate: The (Un)intended
Consequences of School Vouchers, 91 Peabody J. of Educ. 537, 538 (2016). There are also tax
credit/deduction programs that are not discussed. A tax credit/deduction program reduces the
amount of income tax that must be paid in order to help families pay for private education. There
are eight states that have at least one tax credit/deduction programs.
30

Id. at 544.

31

See Types of Private School Choice Programs, supra note 6.

32

Id.

33

School Choice in America Dashboard, supra note 28.

34

Types of School Choice, EdChoice, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/types-of-schoolchoice/ [https://perma.cc/3ST5-S5B2].

35

School Choice in America Dashboard, supra note 28.

36

See id.

37

Types of School Choice, supra note 34.

38

See Types of Private School Choice Programs, supra note 6.

39

See Types of School Choice, supra note 34.

40

Id.
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discrimination, 41 only one state, Maryland, has set a specific non-discriminatory
standard with regard to sexual orientation and gender identity.42
In fact, as states created new forms of publicly funded educational options in
the form of voucher programs, tax credit scholarships, and ESAs, issues of
discrimination have indeed surfaced.43 The question of whether and to what degree
schools should be available to all children without regard to race, national origin,
religion, immigration status, first language, sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity, and disability has a long litigious history.44 It is now routine to observe
that public schools must enroll all students. This has not been the case with voucher
programs.
Private schools that participate in voucher programs are sometimes racially and
socioeconomically concentrated and typically enroll fewer children with disabilities
and English language learners.45 Traditional public schools and charter schools are
prohibited from engaging in this type of discrimination through U.S. constitutional
law (e.g., the Equal Protection Clause) and a series of federal statutes (e.g., Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). Although these
laws may not apply to private schools, states could make non-discriminatory access
and operation a condition that private schools must meet in order to participate in
a voucher program. 46 But so far, legislators have generally elected not to do so.47 In
41

Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29, at 546.

42

Suzanne E. Eckes & Julie F. Mead, Discriminatory Practices in Voucher Programs, Phi Delta
Kappan (Feb. 24, 2020), https://kappanonline.org/discriminatory-practices-school-voucherprograms-eckes-mead/ [https://perma.cc/25H9-Q2XA]. North Carolina’s voucher program was
recently challenged for allegedly discriminating against students based on religion and sexuality.
See Complaint at ¶¶ 47, 47.a, 86, Walker v. State of North Carolina, No. 20CVS8346 (N.C. Sup. Ct.
July 27, 2020).

43

Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29; Valerie Strauss, Problems with Charter Schools that You Won’t
Hear Betsy DeVos Talk About, Wash. Post (June 22, 2017, 10:05 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/06/22/problems-with-charter-schools-that-you-wonthear-betsy-devos-talk-about/?utm_term=.0630221d571f [https://perma.cc/2LCG-BWQA].

44

See Martha Minow, In Brown’s Wake 33–51 (2010).

45

Cory Turner, The Promise and Peril of School Vouchers, Nat’l Pub. Radio (May 12, 2017, 6:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/05/12/520111511/the-promise-and-peril-of-schoolvouchers [https://perma.cc/5C8F-EL8U].

46

See Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29, at 555.

47

Maryland is the only state that specifically includes sexual orientation and gender identity in
its anti-discrimination provisions that apply to voucher recipients. See Eckes & Mead, supra note
29.
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fact, most state voucher laws provide protection against discrimination based on
race and ethnicity; no state laws provide explicit protections for all historically
marginalized populations (those discriminated against on grounds minimally
including religion, race, national origin/ethnicity, disability, sex, and sexual
orientation).48
Moreover, although the voucher program upheld by the Supreme Court in 2002
included provisions to guard against religious discrimination, 49 some religious
schools participating in voucher programs enacted since 2002 exclude students and
families from other religions, and/or exclude LGBT employees and students, as well
as students from LGBT families.50 This topic is especially timely as states continue
to create and expand voucher programs.
When asked whether LGBT students and their families would be welcome at a
private Christian school in Indiana, the principal responded, “We believe that the
Bible clearly teaches that a gay/lesbian lifestyle is contrary to God’s commands.
LGBT students and families would not be able to sign agreement with our
Statement of Faith.”51 Another principal stated that “We welcome any student and
any family that will acknowledge and respect our statement of faith, core values and
philosophy.”52 The practice of excluding students and families on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity may be widespread in the state. For example, the
Archdiocese of Indianapolis reported that their schools received $38.9 million
toward tuition from the voucher program during the 2018–19 school year.53 A recent
policy from the archdiocese states that transgender students may not be eligible for
enrollment.54

48

Id.; See also Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29, at 551.

49

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002).

50

Donheiser, supra note 1.

51

Jeff LaFave, Hotline: A Sensitive Voucher Question, Bloomington Herald-Times (Feb. 10,
2014), https://www.hoosiertimes.com/herald_times_online/opinion/hotline-a-sensitive-voucher
-question/article_104db739-2017-5322-9c90-578474cd8307.html [https://perma.cc/6EDT-5WEV];
Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29.

52

Id.

53

Office of Catholic Schools: Catholic Schools, ArchIndy.org, https://www.archindy.org/ocs/
schools.html [https://perma.cc/UW5K-9ZJM].

54

Arika Herron, Policy May Bar Transgender Students from Catholic Schools in Central and Southern
Indiana, Indianapolis Star (June 24, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/
education/2020/06/24/indianapolis-archdiocese-new-policy-may-bar-transgender-studentsattending-catholic-schools/3252282001/ [https://perma.cc/W2JV-USSW].
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Georgia, too, has gained attention for this type of exclusion.55 One study found
that at least one-third of the private schools participating in Georgia’s program had
explicit anti-gay policies. 56 The study documented how both admissions and
discipline policies work to restrict enrollment for LGBT children and families.57 The
report also pointed out that some national organizations for private schools
encourage such policies based on their interpretation of the Bible.58
Florida is another state with a record of participating religious schools that
exclude students on the basis of sexual orientation. In fact, the Orlando Sentinel
revealed that 83 schools had rules that refused to admit LGBT students or would
expel them upon discovering their sexual orientation and gender identity.59 Some
schools also denied admittance to students on the basis of their parents’ sexual
orientations. 60 This reporting also revealed the plight of Cari and Nicole
Haagenson, a same-sex couple.61 Cari sought to enroll her two oldest children in the
Master’s Academy of Vero Beach, a school that the children had previously attended
when Cari was married to a man. 62 The school refused to admit the girls upon
learning about Cari’s relationship with another woman.63
III. STATE ACTION CHALLENGES

Students and parents like the Haagensons may eventually challenge their
exclusion from certain voucher schools on the account of sexual orientation by
filing suit against the private school, the state, or both. Claims of discriminatory
exclusion are typically cast as denials of equal protection as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.64 If families allege a federal constitutional violation, they
will have to overcome the state action doctrine. As such, they will have to establish
that the actions of a state actor caused the exclusion and that the denial constitutes

55

Severson, supra note 3.

56

Georgia’s Tax Dollars Help Finance Private Schools with Severe Anti-Gay Policies, Practices,
& Teachings, Issue Brief (S. Educ. Found., Atlanta, G.A.), Jan. 2013, at 1–2.

57

Id. at 3–4.

58

Id. at 16.

59

Postal & Martin, supra note 2.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 710–11 (2007);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
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an unjustifiable action that violates the federal Constitution’s mandate of equal
treatment for similarly situated individuals.65
This section analyzes the possibility of a state action claim. Because the
challenge involves a claim of discrimination, the first subpart examines whether the
exclusion of a student on the basis of LGBT status would violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The second subpart then discusses the challenge based on five state action
theories applied by the Supreme Court: (1) the public function test, (2) the symbiotic
relationship test, (3) the state compulsion test, (4) the entwinement test, and (5) the
state enforcement test. As noted earlier, the interaction of state programming with
private actors, both schools and parents, presents challenges to any litigant wishing
to challenge the exclusionary practices of these schools. The analysis shows,
however, that two theories appear to hold more promise for those who may elect to
contest current practices.
A. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a
state shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”66 This clause grants to all Americans “[the] right to be free from invidious
discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity”67 and
requires that similarly-situated individuals be treated the same.68
LGBT students in public schools have argued that under the Equal Protection
Clause, school policies should not treat them differently than heterosexual
students.69 When analyzing an Equal Protection Clause claim, the U.S. Supreme
Court has created three levels of judicial scrutiny for certain classifications of
individuals (i.e., strict scrutiny, intermediate (or heightened) scrutiny, and rational
basis review). 70 Under these levels of scrutiny, it is easier for the state to justify
treating students differently based on sex than it is race. To illustrate, racial
classifications fall under strict scrutiny, which requires “both a compelling
governmental objective and a demonstration that the classification is necessary and

65

John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law 343–45 (2010).

66

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

67

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).

68

Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 65, at 420.

69

See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996); Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.,
400 F. Supp. 3d 444, 451 (E.D. Va. 2019); Kasper ex rel. Adams v. School Bd., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293,
1297 (M.D. Fla. 2018); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 709–10 (D. Md. 2018).
70

Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 65, at 426–28.
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narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”71 Few governmental actions can survive
strict scrutiny.72
The next level is intermediate or heightened scrutiny, which is the standard
used when the government makes sex-based classifications. 73 The government
must demonstrate that “the classification based on sex serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”74
Accordingly, if a school board adopted a policy that prohibited girls from
attending school after age fifteen, it would need to have an important state objective
in adopting such a policy and demonstrate that this sex-based classification was
substantially related to serve that important interest. It would be difficult for any
school board to enforce such a policy because there is no important state interest
involved in prohibiting girls from attending school after age fifteen. It should be
noted that it is not entirely clear within the judicial system whether discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity would receive intermediate scrutiny
review. 75 In 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court held that within employment,
discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity, although that case was litigated under a federal
statute, Title VII, and not a constitutional theory.76 Other lower federal courts have
analyzed the issue under an Equal Protection framework and found that
discrimination based on sex also includes sexual orientation and gender identity
when analyzing cases involving discrimination of LGBT students.77
The third and default level of judicial scrutiny is rational basis review, which
requires “a legitimate government objective with a minimally rational relationship

71

Suzanne E. Eckes & Stephanie D. McCall, The Potential Impact of Social Science Research on Legal
Issues Surrounding Single-Sex Classrooms and Schools, 50 Educ. Admin. Q. 195, 199–200 (2014). See also
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218–20 (1995).

72

See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 65, at 426–27.

73

See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 555 (1996).

74

Eckes & McCall, supra note 71, at 202.

75

See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis review when
student alleged discrimination based on sexual orientation); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,
464 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that sexual orientation discrimination in the military was subject to
rational basis review).
76

Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1740, 1744 (2020).

77

See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017);
Handling ex rel. A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 408 F. Supp. 3d 536, 573–75 (M.D. Pa. 2019);
J.A.W. v. Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 3d 833, 842, 843 (S.D. Ind. 2019).
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between the means and the ends.”78 This deferential level of review stems from the
balance of powers between different parts of the government. When applying
rational basis review, jurists do not weigh the wisdom or effectiveness of a policy,
only its rationality.79 If a policy-making body articulates a rationale within the scope
of its authority, the policy is likely to be upheld under rational basis review, even if
a judge or judges disagree with the rationale given. 80 Classifications based on
sexual orientation, for example, have oftentimes fallen under this level of scrutiny
in the past.81 Rational basis review is a very low level of judicial scrutiny and as a
result, if this level of analysis is applied, it is much easier to justify a government
policy that treats LGBT students differently from other students.
In a public school, an LGBT student who experienced discrimination based on
sexual orientation or gender identity could rely on the Equal Protection Clause to
challenge school officials. Likewise, if plaintiffs demonstrate the presence of state
action in a private school voucher program, these protections would also apply.
Although the Supreme Court has found that racial discrimination in private schools
violates the Equal Protection Clause82 or Section 1981,83 the Court has yet to extend
this thinking for private schools’ treatment of LGBT individuals and as such, it is a
more difficult argument within the context of voucher programs, particularly when
those schools claim religion as their reason for action. As will be discussed, even
when the private school accepts millions of dollars of taxpayer money through the
state’s voucher program, it is unclear whether a court would find state action.
Without a finding of state action for LGBT discrimination in private schools,
students likely have no constitutional protections available.
B. State Action
1. Public Function Test
The public function test provides that a private entity must adhere to the
78

Eckes & McCall, supra note 71, at 199 (citation omitted).

79

Nowak & Ronald, supra note 65, at 426.

80

See id.
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See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1996).

82

See Norwood v. Harris, 413 U.S. 455, 455 (1973) (invalidating state program that provided
textbooks to both public and private schools because state did not consider whether private
schools practiced racial discrimination).

83

See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (holding that Section 1981 prohibited the
racially discriminatory policies of private schools). However, the Court’s holding in Runyon did
not address whether Section 1981 applied to private sectarian schools. Id. at 167.
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Constitution if it is carrying out a task that has been traditionally exclusively
performed by the government. 84 In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 85 the Supreme Court
applied the public function test for the first time to a private school. This case
involved a private high school designed to provide support to at-risk youth.86 Public
school authorities would refer students to the private school and pay the tuition
costs for their attendance.87 While the school was privately owned and operated,
the majority of its funding resulted from public sources.88 A dispute arose at the
school when a few teachers who were fired argued that they did not receive due
process in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 89 Note that the
challengers in this case sued the school directly and argued that the private school
officials were actually state actors because of the close relationship between the
school and the public officials who referred children to them.90 The Court rejected
the teachers’ contention that the school was a state actor because it performed the
public function of providing an education.91 To satisfy the public function test, the
provision of education has to be the “exclusive prerogative of the State.” 92 The
legislature’s decision to provide services to troubled students at public expense “in
no way makes these services the exclusive province of the State.” Since the RendellBaker decision, several courts have held that private schools are not state actors
under the public function test.94 It follows, then, that the anti-LGBT admissions
policies of private schools would not be subject to review under this legal theory.
2. Symbiotic Relationship Test
The symbiotic relationship test examines whether the government has so

84

Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 672.

85

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 836–37 (1982).

86

Id. at 831–32.

87

Id. at 832.

88

Id.
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Id. at 834.
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See id. at 835–36.
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Id. at 842.
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Id.

93

Id.
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See, e.g., Dawkins v. Biondi Educ. Ctr., 164 F. Supp. 3d 518, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Johnson v.
Pinkerton Acad., 861 F.2d 335, 338 (1st Cir. 1988); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646–47 (3rd Cir. 2010);
Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2002); Robert S. v. Stetson
Sch., Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 166 (3rd Cir. 2001).
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“insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with the private entity “that it
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”95 The Supreme
Court first established this test in Burton v. Wilmington Park Authority.96 In this case,
a restaurant that leased space from a parking garage operated by the city parking
authority refused to serve Black customers. 97 The parking authority was a taxexempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the city for the purpose
of operating the city’s parking facilities. 98 The parking authority provided the
restaurant utilities and helped maintain the premises.99 One of the patrons alleged
that this discriminatory treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.100 The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against the patron
because the restaurant was acting in a purely private capacity.101
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the state legislature created the
parking authority and in so doing gave it broad powers.102 The Court reasoned that
there was sufficient state action to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause;
the restaurant was located on public property, and the rent from the restaurant
financially supported the parking authority.103 In fact, the Court suggested that the
state behaved like a joint participant in the operation of this restaurant, reasoning
that the state’s financial position would suffer if the restaurant did not
discriminate. 104 In other words, the state profited from the restaurant’s
discriminatory actions; it was also noted that the restaurant benefited from the
parking authority’s tax-exempt status. 105 As a result, the Court found that the
restaurant and parking authority were so physically and financially intertwined
that the private restaurant’s conduct could be imputed to the government.106
In Rendell-Baker, however, the Court refused to find that a private school for at-
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Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 98 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington
Park. Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
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Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
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risk students had a symbiotic relationship with the government even though the
school received virtually all of its income from governmental funding.107 The Court
distinguished the Burton case by observing that the government had financially
benefited from the restaurant’s discriminatory conduct.108 In contrast, the private
school:
is not fundamentally different from many private corporations whose business
depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for
the government. Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the government
by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public
contracts.109

Because the school’s fiscal relationship with the government was “not different
from that of many contractors performing services for the government,” the Court
concluded that there was no symbiotic relationship, as in Burton.110
In Dawkins v. Biondi Education Center, 111 the Southern District of New York
applied Rendell-Baker to determine whether defendants who worked for a “public
high school with private status” violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the symbiotic
relationship test.112 New York law subjects these types of private schools to heavy
regulation and close supervision.113 Additionally, these schools are almost entirely
funded by the government.114 A former employee alleged that the school violated
various constitutional provisions in the school’s decision to terminate him in
violation of Section 1983.115
The court granted the school’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim.116 The
Southern District of New York refused to find that the school was a state actor under
the symbiotic relationship test. 117 Citing Rendell-Baker, the court ruled that the
receipt of public funding did not transform the school into a state actor.118 Rather,
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Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842–43 (1982).
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Dawkins v. Biondi Educ. Ctr., 164 F. Supp. 3d 518, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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the court explained, to satisfy the symbiotic relationship test, the employee would
have to demonstrate “that this financial support specifically affected the decision to
terminate his employment.” 119 Because the employee merely alleged that the
defendants received substantial funding from the government, he failed to state a
claim under the symbiotic relationship test.120 The employee further attempted to
establish a symbiotic relationship by claiming that the government and the private
schools were engaged in a joint venture: “the educating of New York State students
with learning disabilities.” 121 The court rejected this assertion, noting that the
relationship between the government and the defendants was “purely
contractual.”122 As the court explained, private contractors who perform services
with governmental funding do not become state actors “by reason of their
significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.”123
These cases indicate that students will have a difficult time convincing a court
that voucher schools with anti-LGBT admissions policies are state actors under the
symbiotic relationship test. Specifically, the students must show that the
government must somehow benefit from the discriminatory conduct of the private
school. As these cases make clear, courts will not find such a benefit merely because
the private school is providing educational services with governmental funding.
3. State Compulsion Test
The state compulsion test provides that “a State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice
must in law be deemed to be that of the state.”124 Additionally, this test cautions that
“[m]ere approval or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient
to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”125
In Blum v. Yaretsy, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the state of New York
coerced nursing homes to provide Medicaid recipients with lower levels of care in

119

Id.

120

Id.
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Id. at 529.
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Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841).
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violation of the state action doctrine. 126 The federal Medicaid program provides
federal funding to states to reimburse certain medical costs incurred by people with
low income.127 Federal regulations required that nursing homes providing care to
Medicaid patients establish utilization review committees (URCs) of physicians to
determine the level of care that patients needed. 128 Federal regulations also
required URCs to inform the responsible state agency upon deciding that patients
be discharged or transferred to a different level of care. The state of New York’s
policy provided Medicaid funding for private nursing home care through either
“skilled nursing homes” (SNFs) or “health related facilities” (HRFs). 129 In cases
where URCs recommended that patients be transferred to the less expensive
alternative, the state would discontinue benefits unless the patients agreed to the
transfer.130
Medicaid patients who were subjected to this treatment alleged that the
transfers deprived them of procedural due process rights to adequate notice under
the Fourteenth Amendment.131 The Court rejected the patients’ claim that there was
state action because New York law “affirmatively commands the summary
discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients who are thought to be inappropriately
placed in their nursing facilities.” 132 After analyzing the pertinent statutes and
regulations, the Court concluded that these decisions “ultimately turn on medical
judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not
established by the state.”133
In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,134 the Court addressed
whether the state of Pennsylvania encouraged private insurers to withhold
payments in violation of the state action doctrine. The state amended its worker
compensation law to authorize employers and insurers to withhold payment
pending an independent review to decide whether treatment was “reasonable and
necessary.”135 Workers brought a Section 1983 action, claiming that an insurance
126
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company had withheld particular benefits through the review procedure without
providing due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.136
The workers argued that Pennsylvania “encouraged” the withholding of
payments by amending the statute to provide for utilization review, “an option they
previously did not have.”137 The Court rejected this assertion. It did acknowledge
that the state’s provision of an option for insurers to defer payment pending review
could be seen “as encouraging them to do just that.” 138 However, the Court
characterized the state’s decision as “subtle encouragement” that was “no more
significant than that which inheres the State’s creation or modification of any legal
remedy.”139 Indeed, the Court continued, “[t]he State’s decision to allow insurers to
withhold payments pending review can just as easily be seen as state inaction.”140
The Court declared that it would not impose constitutional restraints on private
actors by characterizing the state’s inaction as encouragement.141
At first glance, the Blum case suggests that students would not be able to show
that states had coerced private schools to discriminate against LGBT students under
the state compulsion test. To establish coercion, the students would have to
demonstrate that the statutes and regulations force private schools to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation.142 Private school choice laws appear to do no such
thing. For example, Florida’s Family Empowerment Scholarship Program, a
voucher program for low-income students, provides, “[b]efore enrolling in a private
school, a student and his or parent or guardian must meet with the private school’s
principal or the principal’s designee to review the school’s. . . code of school
conduct.”143 Similarly, Florida’s Tax Credit Scholarship Program, which is also for
low-income students, declares, “[e]ach parent and each student has an obligation to
the private school to comply with the private school’s published policies.”144 This
language suggests that the private schools, not the state, make decisions as to
whether students are eligible for admission. Thus, it would seem that participating
Florida private schools with anti-LGBT policies would not become state actors
136
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See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005–08 (explaining that New York Medicaid funding policy did not
coerce private reviewers to place patients in nursing homes with lower levels of care).

143

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1002.394(9)(e) (2020).

144

Id. at § 1002.395(7)(d) (2020).

181

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

19:2 (2021)

under a compulsion theory.
However, Dumont v. Lyon145 suggests that Blum is not controlling for privateschool-choice programs because states, not private schools, are the state actors.
Instead, state action might come from the states knowingly creating the
mechanism that enables participating private schools to discriminate. In this case,
two Michigan same-sex couples alleged that state-contracted child placement
agencies rejected them as prospective foster parents because of their sexual
orientation.146 The couples brought a Section 1983 claim in federal district court,
alleging that the state’s Department of Health and Human Services’ practice of
allowing state-contracted and taxpayer funded agencies to use religious criteria to
exclude prospective foster parents was in violation of the Establishment Clause and
Equal Protection Clause.147 It is important to note here that, unlike the other cases
reviewed above, the plaintiffs filed suit against the state itself, not against the
private agencies that had declined to serve them because of their sexual
orientation.148 In other words, they argued that the state acted in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment. They did not argue that the private agencies should be
considered state actors for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
The State Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the decisions of the faithbased agencies could not be attributed to the state per the Blum case.149 The court
denied the defendant’s motion.150 In reaching this decision, the court distinguished
Blum from the instant case. 151 The same-sex couples challenged “a specific state
procedure—the State’s procedure of contracting with faith-based child placing
agencies that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.”152 Thus, the couples’
complaint was not based on the “purely private decisions on the faith-based
agencies in turning them away.”153
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The court went on to say that Blum was not controlling.154 “Because the state
actors in Blum took no action themselves,” the decision explained, “the Supreme
Court necessarily had to determine whether the state should be obligated to
shoulder the blame for solely private action.”155 Conversely, the couples’ assertions
in the instant case suggested that faith-based agencies could refuse to work with
same-sex couples only because of the state department’s practice of entering into
contracts permitting such refusals.156 Therefore, the district court reasoned, “[t]he
State Defendants could thus be liable not because the decision to turn away a samesex couple itself was state action, but because a jury might find that the decision to
turn away a same-sex couple was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
action taken by the State Defendants.”157
Similar to the Dumont case, students who have been denied admission to or
expelled from participating private schools with anti-LGBT policies could argue that
the state action arises from the state’s permission of the schools’ discriminatory
behavior. It is certainly reasonably foreseeable that some faith-based private
schools would discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. It is important to
acknowledge the difference between the Dumont case and the private-school-choice
programs discussed in this article. Dumont dealt with a contract between the state
and faith-based agencies. There is no such contractual arrangement between the
state and participating private schools in private-school-choice programs. But this
distinction should not matter because states require private schools to register with
the state and seek state approval for participation in the program.158 In addition,
states often advertise the existence of the programs and the schools that participate
on state websites.159 Arguably, state voucher programs have set up an even more
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elaborate system that foreseeably leads to sexual orientation discrimination.
Similarly to Dumont, states could stop this foreseeable discriminatory behavior by
forbidding it.
Additionally, students might be able to show that states have significantly
encouraged participating private schools to enforce their anti-LGBT admissions
policies, thus establishing state action. At first glance, this task seems
insurmountable. Citing American Manufacturers, a court might characterize the
failure of private school choice laws to prohibit participating schools from
discriminating on the basis of race as “state inaction.”160 But an examination of
these statutes’ legislative history might reveal that lawmakers were signaling to
certain schools that it was okay to exclude LGBT students. For example, several
states include statutory provisions that require parents and students to comply with
all private school policies, which would include the discriminatory practices causing
exclusion of LGBT youth and families.161 Moreover, some states, like Arizona, alert
participating private schools that they “shall not be required to alter [their] creed[s],
practices, admissions polic[ies] or curricul[a].”162 In these instances, such explicitly
permissive policies exist in statutes that omit any prohibition against religious or
sexual orientation discrimination. 163 This combination, permitting exclusionary
policies in the absence of prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of
religion 164 and/or sexual orientation, could be read as tacit state approval of
exclusionary policies. In such cases, courts might conclude that states were doing
more than merely approving of or acquiescing to the discriminatory practices of
these schools.
The fallout surrounding the Orlando Sentinel’s reporting of the anti-LGBT
admissions policies of participating Florida private schools provides an example.
This revelation came at the time the state legislature was considering House Bill
7067, 165 a bill that would increase the scope of Florida’s private-school-choice
options by raising the household income eligibility for the Florida Empowerment
http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Other-Resources/Scholarships/Ohio-Scholarship-ProvidersInteractive-Directory [https://perma.cc/9GLC-6KHB].
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Scholarship and Florida Tax Credit Programs. Rep. Carlos Guillermo Smith
responded by introducing an amendment to the bill that would prohibit
participating private schools from discriminating against LGBT students. 166 The
state house of representatives voted down the amendment, even though debate
illuminated the exclusionary practices of some participating schools.167 During the
debate, Rep. Jennifer Sullivan asserted that the amendment was unnecessary
because no student had reported being expelled from a school because of their
sexual orientation.168 However, the statements of Rep. Kimberly Daniels, who also
opposed the amendment, suggested that other concerns were at play. Daniels
expressed her opposition to the amendment by acknowledging that Smith had a
right to advocate for the LGBT community. But Daniels also asserted that she had
a right to defend the concerns of religious private schools, explaining, “I’m a
champion of the G-O-S-P-E-L. The gospel of Jesus Christ.”169 Daniels went on to
argue that a non-discrimination requirement would violate the Free Exercise
Clause of participating schools with anti-LGBT admissions requirements. 170
Significantly, she argued that a non-discrimination provision “would trespass on
what we call in the military a A.O. . . . These are the areas of operation of these
private schools.”171 Daniels’ statements suggest that she was not merely acquiescing
to the admissions decisions of these schools. Rather, she was defending these
schools’ “right” to discriminate.172 At a minimum, such state actions may be viewed
as deliberately indifferent 173 to the discriminatory effects of such policy

166

House Amend. 856839, H.R. 7067. (failed).
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pronouncements.
4. Entwinement Test
The entwinement test provides that a private entity is a state actor “when it is
entwined with governmental policies, or when [the] government is entwined in [its]
management or control.”174 The Court first articulated this theory in Brentwood v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association. 175 In Brentwood, an interscholastic
athletic association had penalized a private school for violating the association’s
regulations relating to recruitment.176 The athletic association was a not-for-profit
organization that coordinated sports competitions for public and private high
schools in the state of Tennessee.177 Brentwood Academy, a private parochial school,
was one of the voluntary members of the athletic association. After the association
placed Brentwood Academy on probation for player recruitment violations, the
school sued.178 The private school argued that the association was a state actor and
therefore its enforcement of the rule was in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, among other claims.179
The Court found that the athletic association was a state actor under the
entwinement test. In reaching this decision, the Court observed that 84% of the
association’s membership consisted of public schools. 180 There was also
entwinement between the state board of education and the association. 181 State
board members served on the association’s committees in a nonvoting capacity, and
the association’s ministerial members were treated as state employees “to the extent
of being eligible for membership in the state retirement system.”182
Subsequent litigants have not been able to convince courts of similar
“entwinements” so as to impute state action from the acts of private entities. For
example, applying the entwinement test, the First Circuit in Logiodice v. Trustees of
Maine Central Institute held that a private school, which had contracted with a school
district to educate its high-school-age students at public expense, was not a state
174
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actor under § 1983 when it disciplined a student.183 The student alleged that the
school violated his due process rights by suspending him for seventeen days without
a hearing.184 The contract provided the school’s board of trustees with sole authority
over school disciplinary matters.185
The First Circuit rejected the claim that the private school was a state actor
under the entwinement test. The court identified several similarities between the
instant case and Brentwood: “The state regulate[d] contract schools in various
respects;” the school district sponsored 80% of the contract school students; and “in
certain respects (public busing to extracurricular events, transfer of lower-school
records, assistance with registration), [the contract school’s] students [we]re
treated as if they were regular public school students.”186 However, the First Circuit
found no entwinement because the private trustees, not public school officials, ran
the school, and the school’s contract provided that the trustees had sole authority
over student discipline.187
It is highly unlikely that a court will rule that the anti-LGBT admissions policies
of participating private schools are subject to constitutional scrutiny under the
entwinement test. Unlike Brentwood, there is no entwinement. In fact, the situation
is similar to Logiodice: state laws give control over school admissions policies to
private schools.
5. State Enforcement Test
The Supreme Court established this concept of state action in Shelley v.
Kraemer. 188 Shelley encompassed two cases concerning restrictive covenants that
excluded certain races from owning or occupying real property.189 The first case
involved a ruling by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 190 In 1911, thirty property
owners signed an agreement that prevented their property from being occupied for
fifty years “by any person not of the Caucasian race.”191 In 1945, the Shelleys, a Black
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family, received a warranty deed to one of the parcels subject to the covenant.192 A
white owner of another parcel of land under the covenant sued in state court,
demanding a judgment enforcing the covenant and divesting the Shelleys of the
title. 193 A state trial court denied the requested relief. 194 The Missouri Supreme
Court reversed and directed the lower court to enforce the covenant.195 The second
case came from the Michigan Supreme Court.196 That court also enforced a similarly
worded racially restrictive covenant.197
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed both decisions on the ground that the judicial
enforcement of the racial covenants violated the Equal Protection Clause.198 The
Court observed that these agreements by themselves did not deprive the prospective
Black landowners of their constitutional rights. 199 However, the judicial
enforcement in state courts of these racially restrictive covenants did constitute
state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.200 The Court reached this
conclusion because “the States have made available to [the private persons wishing
to discriminate] the full coercive power of the government to deny to petitioners,
on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights.”201
It is important to note, however, that legal scholars have expressed concern
about the danger that the state action theory first enunciated in Shelley. As Laurence
Tribe has explained, the consistent application of Shelley’s principles “would require
individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional standards
whenever, as almost always, the individuals might later seek the security of
potential judicial enforcement.” 202 To avoid this problem, several courts have
limited the scope of Shelley to disputes involving racial discrimination. 203 This
192
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restriction would seemingly foreclose any challenge to anti-LGBT provisions under
a state enforcement theory of state action.
However, in Lavoie v. Bigwood, 204 the First Circuit applied a more expansive
approach to Shelley that could enable students to challenge the state enforcement of
anti-LGBT admissions provisions. In Lavoie, a tenant rented space in a mobile park
located in New Hampshire. 205 After complaining to public officials about the
owner’s management of the park, the tenant alleged that the owner brought an
eviction proceeding through a state municipal court. 206 In response, the tenant
sued in state court, alleging that the defendants sought the eviction in retaliation
for the tenant’s exercise of his rights of speech and association. 207 The tenant
further claimed that New Hampshire’s landlord-tenant and zoning laws
transformed the “purely private” landlord-tenant relationship into state action.208
A federal district court dismissed the case, finding that the owner’s alleged conduct
was not state action.209
The First Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision. 210 In reaching this
conclusion, the appellate court identified two “polar propositions” in the state
action jurisprudence.211 Terms like “state compulsion or involvement” resided at the
“state action” pole whereas phrases like “neutrality,” “purely private,” and “merely
private” resided at the opposite pole.212 In sorting out the use of these terms, the
court acknowledged that states were involved in private action to some degree.213
To develop its own theory of neutrality, the First Circuit relied on a Supreme
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Court case, Griffin v. Maryland.214 In Griffin, a deputy sheriff sought to prosecute
certain Black patrons for criminal trespass because they refused to leave a privatelyowned amusement park. 215 Maryland contended that there was no state action
because it was “not really enforcing a policy of segregation since the owner’s
ultimate purpose [was] immaterial to the state.”216 The Court rejected this assertion
because the president of the corporation managing the park had asked the deputy
sheriff to enforce its policy of racial segregation.217
The First Circuit took the following principle from Griffin: “A state, then, must
be more strictly neutral than to permit any of its officers to identify the subjects of
the discrimination in the first instance.”218 Although Griffin did not cite Shelley, the
First Circuit viewed Shelley to be an earlier application of this neutrality principle.219
To enforce the covenant, the court explained, “the state court had necessarily to take
evidence that the prospective buyer was black and to take notice that the clause
being enforced was a racially restrictive one.”220 Citing Shelley and Griffin, the First
Circuit then developed a theory of neutrality to be applied to cases apart from racial
discrimination:
[A] state may at the behest of private persons apply sanctions pursuant to general
rules of law which have discriminatory as well as non-discriminatory application if it
does not accept the responsibility of employing a discriminatory classification. Such
responsibility would exist when, in resorting to a state sanction, a private party must
necessarily make the state privy to his discriminatory purpose. Similarly, in such a case
as this, the state would retain a neutral posture unless it was necessarily apprised of the
landlord’s purpose to violate rights of free speech and association. While not entirely
satisfactory, this approach at least recognizes conscious state involvement without
insisting upon an unattainable purity.221

Applying this standard of neutrality, the First Circuit reasoned that an eviction in
retaliation of First Amendment rights, standing alone, was private action. 222
However, it held that the mobile park tenant sufficiently alleged state action by
“asserting a town purpose to restrict sites for mobile homes and a concomitant
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private monopoly over the allocation of those sites.”223 It is important to note that
the Lavoie case did not involve the state court enforcement of a private person’s
request to deprive another person of their constitutional rights. Nevertheless,
Lavoie clearly indicates that state enforcement of a private action would be state
action if the party to a lawsuit apprises a state court of its unconstitutional
motivation.224
Building on Shelley and Lavoie, plaintiff families may argue that the state
effectively enforces private schools’ anti-LGBT policies that deprive students of a
state benefit under the Due Process Clause. Such state agency enforcement would
violate the Equal Protection Clause on the basis of sexual orientation. For example,
Indiana requires that each private school annually register and be approved for
participation in its voucher program.225 That process requires each school to submit
a current copy of the school’s admissions policy.226 Only those schools that have
been “approved” by the state agency are listed as participating schools.227 As such, a
school’s admissions policy that denies admission to LGBT students gains approval
and enforcement by the state. Plaintiffs may also argue that because the child meets
all state eligibility requirements for participation in the voucher program, any
deprivation of the benefit is also a deprivation of a property interest—the
entitlement to participate in a state benefit on terms equal to others. To establish a
property interest to this benefit, the student would have to establish “more than an
abstract need or desire” and “more than a unilateral benefit.”228 Instead, the student
must have a “legitimate claim of entitlement.”229 Property interests are not created
by the federal constitution, but are derived from independent sources such as state
law.230 Although these programs are created by state law, federal constitution law
determines whether this interest associated with the benefit of voucher
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participation rises to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement.231
By examining the school choice statutes, regulations, and legislative history, the
student would attempt to show that state law guarantees them a right to equal
access to a state benefit 232 —participation in a voucher program—and that the
state’s role in tacitly enforcing the school’s action is attempting to deny the student
of that benefit. Representative Anna Eskamani raised this concern in the debate
over House Bill 7067, which expanded school choice in Florida. She explained,
. . . as we expand this program to more and more kids,. . . you’re going to see more
kids who are gay who won’t benefit, and I am concerned that if you are a gay child
growing up in a different part of the state, and you want to practice choice, but every
school in that perimeter has anti-LGBT policies, does that child have choice?233

If a student could establish such a property right to participation in the program, it
would follow that the state court enforcement of the anti-LGBT policy would violate
the Equal Protection Clause. As in Shelley, the state would “have made available to
[the private persons wishing to discriminate] the full coercive power of the
government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of [sexual orientation].”234 In
effect, the argument would be that anti-LGBT policies are the restrictive covenants
of voucher program participation.
IV. CONCLUSION

As this discussion shows, the reason we have yet to see litigation on the
exclusion of LGBT students from private schools participating in voucher programs
likely stems from the obstacles to convincing a court that sufficient state action
exists to incur the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, those theories
that would involve suing the schools directly–the public function test, the symbiotic
relationship test, and the entwinement test–hold little promise of success. In each
instance, it would be difficult, given existing precedent, to convince a court that the
participation of the private school in a public program transformed school officials
into state actors subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.235
However, two approaches may provide an avenue for success: the state
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compulsion test and the state enforcement test. In both instances, plaintiffs would
challenge the state directly for its unequal implementation of the voucher program.
In other words, like the plaintiffs in Dumont, challengers would “allege that their
claims concern only the State’s provision of taxpayer-funded government services
based on religious and discriminatory criteria and do not challenge any private
[school’s] provision of [educational] services or use of non-public funds.” 236
Whether cast as state compulsion or state enforcement, courts might well agree that
states cannot divorce their actions from those of the private schools when the result
is a group of children with limited access to a state-created benefit. As the Supreme
Court ruled in the landmark marriage equality case, Obergefell v. Hodges,
Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.237

It is also interesting to observe that many of the cases that have refused to
recognize state action have litigated claims under the Due Process Clause rather
than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and many asserted
the rights of adult workers rather than those of students. While both claims
obviously hinge on the presence or absence of a state actor, the fact that the
situations involve exclusionary admissions policies directed at a discreet group of
children may give jurists pause. The parallels between these exclusionary practices
and earlier practices of private schools’ denial of children’s access on the basis of
race 238 may make courts more open to the complaints of excluded children and
families.
It is also important to acknowledge that getting a court to recognize state action
is only the first step. Even if a court recognizes the state’s role in the exclusion of
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LGBT children from state-funded voucher programs, plaintiffs would then have to
survive states’ defenses of those programs. For example, a state may argue that a
child can choose another private school without similar restrictions or could return
to the public school system. As such, the state may argue that the child has not
suffered sufficient injury to bring a claim. However, to quote the Dumont court once
more, “[p]laintiffs’ need not demonstrate that they would have been completely
foreclosed–only that they could not compete for the right to [to participate in the
voucher program] on the same footing as everyone else.”239
States may also contend that their actions serve the legitimate purpose of
respecting the religious rights of participating private schools. While a full
explication of the tension between religious freedoms of the schools on the one
hand and the rights of children to enjoy the benefits of state programs free from
discrimination on the basis of religion and sexual orientation on the other is beyond
the scope of this paper, a key to this tension may be in the purpose of the program.240
Because the programs have been designed to benefit children and their families, the
argument could be made that the state’s first obligation is to ensure that any benefit
created by the programs is offered to those primary beneficiaries on equal terms.
In fact, the Zelman Court’s approval of the Cleveland voucher program rested on the
idea that the benefit accrued to the child and that the funding received by
participating schools was an indirect result of the private choices of these parents.241
The children were viewed as the primary beneficiaries of the program. Elevating a
school’s asserted right to deny admission to a child on the basis of sexual orientation
would subvert the primary purpose of the program. Moreover, the Supreme Court
directed that any voucher program that includes religious schools must ensure that
“[p]rogram benefits are available to participating families on neutral terms, with no
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reference to religion.” 242 A state’s approval and enforcement of private schools’
exclusionary practices result in participation being offered on non-neutral terms
with reference to religion.
The last five years have borne witness to incredible advances in the recognition
of the rights of LGBT individuals. From the landmark ruling guaranteeing the right
to marry243 to the recent recognition that federal non-discrimination law forbids
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, 244 the
Supreme Court has mandated that states respect the rights of all individuals to be
treated fairly. In so doing, the protections of federal law have been extended and
the Court has explicitly noted that the rights of every LGBT person must be legally
protected from state actions that result in the diminution of a person’s dignity. It
would be a perversion of justice to place state-operated voucher programs outside
the ambit of those protections. For as the Court observed just five short years ago,
“The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes
certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and
express their identity.” 245 That liberty must extend to all children who seek to
participate in state voucher programs. Only then will the troubling headlines cease.
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